

**DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY THE MIP
FOR THE MISSILES**

6D2. Letter from Mr Filip Reyntjens to Mr Bernard Cazeneuve, 10 December 1998, Additional information on the SA 16 missiles

**UNIVERSITY
OF ANTWERP**

**Mr Bernard Cazeneuve
Reporter of the fact-finding
mission on Rwanda**

Fax: 00 33 1 49 63 53 27

Antwerp, 10 December 1998

Dear Sir

In response to your letter of 3 December, I hereby confirm that I have obtained the serial numbers of the SA 16 launchers from the FAR [Rwandan armed forces], and more particularly Colonel Bagosora. This information was sent to me via the Colonel's solicitor, Mr Luc De Temmerman.

I would like to take this opportunity to confirm to you in writing what I told you during our last meeting in Brussels, i.e. that my former British and Belgian sources have confirmed to me (my British source added "adamantly") that according to their information these missiles came from a stock taken by France in Iraq.

Yours faithfully

Filip Reyntjens

[ILLEGIBLE]

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FRENCH REPUBLIC

FRENCH EMBASSY
IN RWANDA

MILITARY ASSISTANCE
MISSION

22 MAY 1991

Kigali, 22 May 1991

N° 148/AD/RWA

FAX

TO:

CERN

FOR THE ATTENTION OF: [illegible]

FAX SUBJECT:

Surface-to-air defence weapons type SA 16

TPH: REFERENCE(S):

[illegible] 145/AD/RWA of 19 May 1991

TEXT:

Dear colonel

[text illegible]

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF THE AUTHORITY

NUMBER OF PAGES

FRENCH REPUBLIC
EMBASSY OF FRANCE
IN
RWANDA
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
MISSION

**6.D.4 Memo of the military assistance mission in Kigali, 22 May 1991,
Surface-to-Air Defence Weapon SA 16**

Declassified

SUBJECT: SURFACE-TO-AIR DEFENCE WEAPON TYPE SA 16

**PRIMO: THE STAFF OF THE RWANDAN ARMY IS ABLE TO GIVE THE
DEFENCE ATTACHE AN EXAMPLE OF A SOVIET SURFACE-TO-
AIR DEFENCE WEAPON TYPE SA 16 RECOVERED FROM THE
REBELS ON 18 MAY 1991 DURING AN CLASH IN THE PARK OF
AKAGERA**

**THIS WEAPON IS NEW
ITS ORIGIN MAY BE UGANDAN
VARIOUS INSCRIPTIONS, THE BREAKDOWN OF WHICH IS
GIVEN HEREAFTER, COULD DETERMINE ITS PROVENANCE:**

**a) ON THE TUBE: 9II 322-1-01
04-87
04-924
9 M 313-1
04-87
04924**

**C
LOD. COMP**

**b) IN FRONT OF THE COOLER:
96236
20-2565
P: 350 KG F/CM2
10-87-1
304 K**

**c) ON THE CIRCUIT SUPPORT PLATE:
709 868 (IN INDELIBLE INK)**

.../...

[illegible]

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0025083522 1991-05-22 12:16 CH-48 S

-2-

**SECUNDO: IN THE EVENT WHERE AN ORGANISATION MAY BE
INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING THIS WEAPON, I ASK YOU TO
PLEASE SPECIFY ITS DESTINATION AND THE TERMS
RELATIVE TO ITS TRANSPORT TO FRANCE.**

**6.D.5 Message from the defence attaché in Kigali, 10 August 1991,
Possession of missiles by the FPR**

Declassified

**SUBJECT: SITUATION OF THE DETAINEES AT KIGALI PRISON, ACCUSED
OF HAVING FOUGHT AGAINST RWANDA (INKOTANYI)**

CONTINUED FROM MY TD KIGALI 600

**WITH REGARD TO THE ORIGIN OF THE MISSILES USED BY THE FPR,
ONLY ONE PRISONER, JOHN GASORE, WHO ACTED AS COMPANY
COMMANDER WITH THE INKOTANYI AFTER HAVING UNDERGONE CADET
TRAINING WITHIN THE NRA, DECLARED TO KNOW THE SA 16.**

**THE FPR ALLEGEDLY POSSESSED SEVERAL OF THEM FROM 4
OCTOBER AFTER HAVING PURCHASED THEM IN EUROPE FROM ARMS
TRAFFICKERS. THIS DECLARATION, WHICH HAD THE STATED AIM OF
SPECIFYING THAT THE NRA HAD TRAINED THE FIGHTERS BUT WAS NOT
ENGAGED IN CONFLICT, CAN HOWEVER BE LIKENED TO THAT OF MAJOR
NYIRIGIRA, EX-COMMANDANT OF THE 310TH BRIGADE OF THE NRA, THEN
THE 3RD BATTALION OF THE FPR, THE ONLY SUPERIOR OFFICER
CAPTURED, WHO DECLARED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE SA 16 BUT
KNEW THAT THE FPR HAD PURCHASED 8 SAM 7s BEFORE 1ST OCTOBER.**

**ALL THE PRISONERS INTERVIEWED OBVIOUSLY WISHED TO BE
RELEASED AND OFFERED TO BE EXCHANGED AGAINST RWANDAN
SOLDIERS DETAINED AT THE REMAND CENTRE OF MBARARA PROVIDED
TO THE FPR BY UGANDA. PRISONER MURENGASHURO, WHO ALLEGEDLY
DROVE PRISONERS IN JANUARY 1991, DECLARED THAT AT THIS TIME
THERE WERE 62 RWANDAN SOLDIERS INCARCERATED, INCLUDING A SUB-
LIEUTENANT, AND THAT KANYARENGWE VISITED THEM FREQUENTLY TO
VERIFY THE CONDITIONS OF THEIR DETENTION.**

**NB: THE SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE PRISONERS INTERVIEWED
WILL BE SENT BY FAX TO THE RECIPIENTS OF THIS OT, AS THEY
CANNOT BE SENT BY THIS MEANS.**

SIGNED: COLONEL CUSSAC. 121745.

**6.D.6 Message from the defence attaché in Kigali, 13 August 1991,
Recovery and transport of an SA 16 missile**

Declassified

RECOVERY AND TRANSPORT OF AN SA 16

OT. FIRST REFERENCE STIPULATED THAT EMAT/BRRI WOULD LOOK INTO TRANSPORT OF THE WEAPON WITH APPROPRIATE SERVICE. HAD TO ADVISE A.D. DIRECTLY ON THE STEPS TO TAKE. NO PARTICULAR DIRECTIVE WAS GIVEN IN THIS WAY.

CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT IT MAY BE DANGEROUS TO TRANSPORT THIS MISSILE VIA VA IN CASE IT HAS BEEN INITIATED. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR A SPECIALIST TO COME AND CHECK THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSPORT ON-SITE.

YOUR EMBASSY IN KAMPALA HAS BEEN ASKED TO SEEK INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE HOLDING OF THIS WEAPON BY NRR AND SUPPLIER COUNTRY. FROM INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM PRISONER OF WAR HELD IN KIGALI AND QUESTIONED BY AD (SEE MY OT NMR 214/AD/RWA OF 10 AUGUST 1991), IT EMERGES THAT THE FPR HAVE POSSESSED A FEW EXAMPLES OF IT SINCE 4 OCTOBER 1990 AFTER HAVING PURCHASED THEM IN EUROPE FROM ARMS TRAFFICKERS. (AN SA 16 COOLING SYSTEM WAS PICKED UP IN THE FIELD BY THE RWANDAN ARMY IN NOVEMBER 1990).

THIS SAME FPR ALLEGEDLY PURCHASED 8 SAM 7s ON 10 OCTOBER 1990.

THE INFORMATION SENT BY KAMPALA WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR UPON RECEIPT.

COLONEL CUSSAC. 130930.

Kigali, 28/02/94

Dear

With the FPR at the CND, i.e. 1km from the TWR and with the bias that you know by the UN alias UNAMIR, we are almost certain that there are SAM 7 and other missiles that are threatening us for the flights of the [illegible] 50. The FPR has already detected a circle of 1km of Ø around the CND [illegible] prohibited zone. They prevented Air France from taking off in 28, the aeroclub no longer flies and has reminded us of the order each time it [illegible] to make the jumps commanded. The Belgian C130 was [illegible].

I am therefore contacting you to [illegible] you of the missiles that they had in the north [illegible] they had [illegible] the islander and the [illegible]. Give me the performance of these missiles, Cussac told me of SA7s? But [illegible] there is no shortage of SA 16s.

Security alt to adopt ([illegible] we must take account of the 5,000 alt [illegible]. [illegible] opposite the CND (as in [illegible] 28) is it detectable? What can we do so as not to have this taken?

With [illegible] we are looking into the faults and [illegible] Alt low. DEC [illegible] to the right in the valley, [illegible] last 5 REBEROs we were hidden by the hill for the reverse [illegible] attack. We did it Saturday, with the President. They were [illegible] but learned that there was danger and that we were not calm.

This is going to look into an arrival high Alt NOV 2000 and they think it normal everything reduced headlights off. I do not know if this is effective. Perhaps you know hunters who will have solutions to do this type of problem. There is indeed a solution – it is to withdraw. I think that this is going to [illegible] like this because here there is no future, they are becoming Burundi at speed V. The FPR is concentrating the heavy artillery [illegible] the TUMBA, the ONLI (like the GOM before) sees nothing. The [illegible] families were massacred by the [illegible] like at BJN here in Kigali. In the hills it doesn't [illegible] further except in Butare where in a [illegible] they killed the leader of the CDR. The FPR has succeeded in that the Hutus are killing each other (1 minister and the CDR leader). They [illegible] like [illegible], they do what they like [illegible] at whim or faced with young Tutsis that they pick up at night, hide at the CND, and when the [illegible] is quite [illegible] transport to the [illegible] zone escorted by the UNAMIR [illegible]? For the government based on [illegible] they don't yet totally have the majority in the National Assembly and the ministers that they want thus [illegible]. Obviously it is all the fault of the President QED!!! The Hutus are still selling sometimes and giving as much sometimes, until when?? Zaire also at the north [illegible] (border with Uganda) Tutsis refugee zone where they are 80%, they undertake ethnic cleansing to correct the remaining 20% [illegible]. [illegible sentence]. Same [illegible] alongside Lobynbachi. The big Tutsi Land is [illegible].

Best wishes

Jean [illegible]

INFORMATION MEMO

30 January 1998
N° 13112/N

RWANDA – UGANDA

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ATTACK OF 6 APRIL 1994 AGAINST PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

According to certain uncorroborated information, the two missiles which allegedly hit the aeroplane of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 were IGLA SA 16 missiles (1), of the same model as those used by the Ugandan army.

For all useful purposes, the numbers of the surface-to-air missiles currently allocated within the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) are cited in annex 1. Some of the numbers of these weapons are very similar to the batches cited by Mr Filip Reyntjens, professor of law at the universities of Antwerp and Brussels, who mentioned in his work "Rwanda – Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire" (Cahiers Africains/l'Harmattan-1996) the numbers of the launchers of the two missiles (cf. annex 2), that he declared he had found close to the place of the attack.

(1) Anti-air missiles of around 3,000m range, of Soviet manufacture

ANNEX 1

**SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES CURRENTLY ALLOCATED
IN THE UGANDAN ARMY**

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES	LAUNCHER NUMBER	LOCATION
SA 16 IGLA	04869	MBARARA
SA 16 IGLA	04889	“
SA 16 IGLA	04870	“
SA 16 IGLA	04838	“
SA 16 IGLA	04947	“
SA 16 IGLA	04815	FORT PORTAL
SA 16 IGLA	04816	“
SA 7	3388	MBARARA
SA 7	1506	“
SA 7	3434	“
SA 7	3548	“
SA 7	3501	“
SA 7	3470	“
SA 7	3500	“
STRELLA	101231	“
STRELLA	101232	“
STRELLA	050704	“
STRELLA	01345	“
STRELLA	04555	“
STRELLA	04334	“
STRELLA	050787	“
STRELLA	050788	“
STRELLA	051521	“
STRELLA	050691	“

**IDENTIFICATION OF THE TWO LAUNCHERS
INFORMATION PUBLISHED BY FILIP REYNTJENS IN
“RWANDA – TROIS JOURS QUI ONT FAIT BASCULER L’HISTOIRE”**

First launcher:

**9 II 322-1-01
9 M 313-I
04-87
04835
C
LOD COMP
9 II 519-2
3555406**

Second launcher:

**9 II 322-1-01
9 M 313-I
04-87
04814
C
LOD COMP
9 II 519-2
594107**

[picture]

Close window

Hirondelle agency for information, documentation and training, Arusha (Tanzania): News
07/02/06

ICCR/SOLDIERS I – THE WITNESS STATEMENT OF BAGOSORA REIGNITES THE DEBATE ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

Arusha, 3 February 2006 (FH) – A real hobby horse of the principal accused parties at the International Criminal Court of Rwanda (ICCR), the assassination of Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 has been constantly haunting the work of the court.

In their innumerable letters to the presiding judge of the ICCR and in their witness statements, the leading figures of the former regime are demanding an inquiry into this attack, which they consider to be the trigger element for “excessive massacres”, to borrow the words of the most famous of them, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, presented by the prosecutor as the brain of a genocide in which he does not believe.

His solicitors thus lodged on 13 December a long petition in which they asked the chamber to order the prosecutor’s office to launch an inquiry into this assassination. One week later, the representative of the Prosecutor, Drew White, lodged his response in which he calls on the judges to reject the petition, explaining that Bagosora was not pursued for the assassination of President Habyarimana. The judges have not yet rendered their decision.

While deploring the “shocking, immoral and atrocious” nature of this attack, White notably states that it is not within the mandate of the ICCR, which is limited to “crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity”.

This new heated exchange originates in the witness statement of Bagosora for his own defence, a little over two months ago. In his principal interview, the key accused party declared several times that the essential responsibility for the 1994 tragedy was incumbent upon the assassin of President Habyarimana.

On 16 November, in his counter-questioning, White had however suggested to him that the attack had been organised by those close to the Chief of State, including Bagosora himself. He accused the colonel of having hatched the plan for the physical elimination of Habyarimana because he had just agreed to no longer block the application of the peace agreement, which robbed the heavy weights of the regime of their important political and economic powers.

Unlike Bagosora, the Prosecutor’s substitute declared that the Rwandan government army did indeed have surface-to-air missiles in its arsenal. White then produced a letter written on 17 January 1992 by the deputy Chief of Staff of the army, Colonel Laurent Seubuga, to the minister for defence, advising him to purchase “a SAM 16 battery comprising 12 launchers and 120 missiles”. According to Bagosora, this weapon was never purchased, even though the government had made an order and received an invoice.

Curiously, White remarked, the serial numbers mentioned on the proforma invoice were the same as those featuring on the battery received by the Rwandan army in Masaka (near Kigali) on the day after the attack. Response from Bagosora, “we were offered the chance to make an order; we didn’t buy. In the meantime, somebody else could buy.”

An initial petition demanding an inquiry into the death of President Habyarimana had been rejected by the chamber in 2000, which was two years before the opening of the trial.

ER/PB/GF

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